The paper explores some of the reasons for the apparent incommensurability of interpretative attitudes in the consumption of Chinese media products in the West. It also addresses the difficulties faced by existing audience theories in explicating cross--cultural media communication, especially as it applies to the cultural and political divide between China and the West, a phrase I use non--reductively as no more than an abbreviation. The focus of
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4 the extent that they have captured 'much of the world's attention in the past decade'. (Keane 2007: 34) The success of China's emerging 'soft power' (ruan shili), Michael Keane observes, 'was symbolized by the Beijing Olympics in 2008 '. (Keane 2011 Yet there is a degree of reticence in the Western reception of Chinese media products that has less to do with cultural Chineseness than with the fact that the soft power package also contains a hefty dose of the ideological persuasion of the current Chinese government. Certainly, Chinese soft power has not been quite as effective as it was intended to be. (Huang 2013) Another complicating factor is that Chinese soft power is as much 'inward--looking' as it is 'outward--looking'. (Barr 2011: 28; 35; 2012: 82) There is a marked difference between its domestic purpose in creating a positive 'collective imagination' and its international aim of 'branding the nation' globally.
How to reconcile these goals is a serious challenge for Chinese media producers. At home Chinese producers face two hurdles, official support and censorship. This affects 'what Chinese citizens can possibly consume or produce in terms of information online'. (Oates 2008: 185) Challenged by the dual goal of global and domestic targeting, the progressive wing of the CCP has realized that any domestic employment of 'raw power inevitably harms Beijing's own efforts to promote a peaceful image'. (Barr 2012: 85; 83) What is on offer domestically 'needs to avoid "chaos" at all cost, including heavy--handed censorship, in order to ensure … social stability and national unity', (Sun 2010: 66) while what is disseminated abroad must take greater cognizance of Western audience expectations. 5 the observation that processing media messages is 'a learned cultural practice' make more sense than in the soft power exchange between China and the West. (Brasell 1992: 55) If the West is to become a more competent reader of Chinese media products, it needs to significantly expand its interpretive frame of reference. According to 'cultivation theory', the West must embrace an 'accumulation of media experience' if it is to appreciate 'media influence'. (Staiger 2005: 59) Such an 'accumulation' has already taken place to a certain degree in the domain of the reception of Chinese cinema, foremost through the films of Zhang Yimou. (Zhang 2004) While Zhang Yimou's early films tended to be banned in China for depicting the nation's poverty, simple folks and the immorality of sex scenes, they were received enthusiastically by Western audiences. We would be amiss, though, if we were to read the three cases merely in such a binary fashion. For the situation of cross--cultural reception is not free of the logic of trans--national politics. Viewing the contrast without paying attention to the pressure exerted by global politics on the Chinese government and Chinese cultural sensitivities would assume a dubious interpretive innocence on the part of the Western critic. Moreover, in analysing the three cases we must acknowledge the fundamental asymmetry that exists between subjects in China and the West. Ironically, it is the relative critical freedom of this reader which may be viewed with suspicion by Chinese media experts as part of the global hegemonic politics which post--Enlightenment reasoning finds hard to eschew. In this light, negative Western responses to Zhang Yimou's latest film express an unfulfilled demand for a revolutionary potential rarely explored by and demanded from Hollywood. Western reactions to Confucius Institutes can be read as expressing a fear of a well--guarded turf suddenly threatened by a serious competitor; and the Kadeer case could be said to expose a contrast between a well--developed degree of sensitivity in matters of freedom of expression and a not so well--nourished auto--critique of the shortcomings of Western political, economic, and social structures. In short, in the analysis of cross--cultural media reception, the Enlightenment heritage of critique should retain a certain distance from the dominant political and economic structures of the West. Whereas Channel 10 showed images of disrupted city life, CCTV 4 chose to turn the natural disaster into a story of 'good people and good deeds'. Volunteers were shown driving to Beijing airport to collect stranded passengers. Perhaps the two 'horizons of expectations' remain artificially incommensurable as a consequence of political interference. Yet, political steering is not the only factor to be considered here. The interpreting subjects are also culturally constituted in markedly different ways. On the one hand, we have an audience that appears traditionally sceptical, even if thoughtlessly so; on the other hand, the Chinese audience meets official messages halfway, yearning as they do for the rise of a once more glorious China. Cultural nationalism is a powerful force in China. As such, the 'horizon of expectations' is by no means a self--evident concept. It requires historical, cultural, social, and political specification.
Incommensurable approaches
Important for cross--cultural media consumption is that producers are themselves always already an audience; they 'actively imagine the ways' in which 'audiences will respond to their works'. (Nightingale 2003: 368f.) In our case, the West to be persuaded has not been imagined in an entirely effective manner. Otherwise it would be difficult to understand why Chinese cultural production has not been more readily embraced in the West. Nightingale's 'imagined audience' must also be distinguished from the measurable, empirical audiences and their function in the constitution of cultural objects. This essential distinction is sometimes neglected in audience research, as in Barrie Gunter observation that
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'reception analysis is effectively the audience research arm of modern cultural studies, rather than an independent tradition'. (Gunter 2000: 19) This forgets the important point of reception theory that complex objects such as stories are not empirical data but imagined constructs, intentional objects, In describing cross--cultural audiences, we must account for 'the social world of actual audiences' (Ang 1991: 13) while acknowledging that no audience can be successfully described as 'external to its sentences and the objects of the world, nor by its abstractive potential, but rather by the normative rules emphasizing the specificity of titles, names and rank (ming), appropriate conduct (li) informed by moral principle (de). As a result, both the meta--rule of obedience and normative nominalism powerfully reinforce social order and political authority. Since Confucius this has been a rarely disputed belief system which is effective to this day and still throws a retarding shadow on the introduction of Why, then, is China's attempt to make its soft power campaign more effective a 'mission impossible'?
In Sun's analysis, the failure of the 'Chinese party--state and its media to present a convincing picture of openness, transparency, and objective media outlook in a sustained and systemic way' is the result of China's 'inability to adopt a set of institutionally--sanctioned news values and news--gathering practices which are truly independent of political and ideological control and constraints'. (Sun 2010: 67f.) According to Chin--Hao Huang (2013) , the failure of Chinese soft power in Asia is the result of Beijing resorting to military coercion in the resolution of territorial disputes and China's refusal to political reform. What I want to add here is that the failure is not entirely China's. Both Chinese and Western media producers and audiences are captives of their respective political and cultural frames of reference, a relation that is not exhausted by two deeply different histories of ideas, but must include also the logic of transnational politics which powerfully intervenes in cross--cultural media consumption.
Conclusion
Given these complications in the process of the cross--cultural reception of media products, it should not come as a surprise that the interpretive 'horizons of expectations' characteristic of Western and Chinese audiences should be different and, for the time being, incommensurate. This situation, however, cannot be viewed from the West as a failure to be laid solely at the doorstep of China. It has partly also to do with a Western fear of a rising China beneath which one can discover 'a deeper set of questions concerning identity'. For if part of that fear has to do with the perception of China's expansive nationalism, we must also realize that it is 'easier to recognize nationalism in others than in oneself' Only then can the current politics of reception as cross--cultural incompatibility be superseded by genuine global dialogue.
